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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
PHI KAP·PA IOTA FRATERNITY,
a non-profit corporation, and · DR.
FLOYD F. HATCH,
P~imtiffs

a;nd Appellants,

vs.

Case No.

SALT LAKE CITY, a municip·al corporation, EARL J. GLADE, FRED
TED· E S C 0, City Commissioners;
CLEVE WOOLLEY and W. Y. TIPTON,

7357

Defendants arru1 Resrpondents.

RE S.PONDENTS' BRIEF
1

~s:TATEMENT

O·F FACTS

In 1927 Salt Lake City adopted a comprehensive
zoning ordinance after holding public hearings ('T. page
84). As originally enacted the zonin·g ordinance divided the City into the following use ·districts : Residential ''A,'' Residential '' A-2,'' Residential '' B'' and
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'' B-2,'' Residential '' C, '' Commercial, Industrial, Industrial '' B'' and Unrestricted. The uses permitted in
Residential ''A'' District remained in all respects the
same to the present time, except for the am·endmen't
complained o.f by plaintiffs. On page 8 of plaintiff's
brief, the pertinent parts of the present ordinance, as
amended in January 1939, relating to R:esidential ''A''
District, are quoted. The amendment involved only
sub-paragraph 6 of paragraph (h), suh-pa·ragraph (b)
containing 7 sub-paragra~phs each enumerating an exception to the restrictions imposed in paragraph (a).
Prior to the amendment this sub-paragraph read: "6.
Dormitories, fraternity or sorority houses or boarding houses occupied only by the faculty or s1tudents of
a public educational institution and supervised by the
authorities thereof.''
The 193'9 amendment retained the above language
and ·simply added thereto the following: ''subject, however, to ~the express condition that such dormitories or
fraternity or sorority houses shall not be located or established more than 600 feet distant from the land and
p·remises occupied by the institution to which they are
incident.' '
As so amended this ordinance has stood unchallenged and unchanged since its adoption in January
19-39 until this ·present action was commenced by plaintiffs in November 1948, nearly 10 years later.
It will he noticed that the ordinanye before amended
referred only to public educational instiitutions, and did
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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not permit fraternities in Residential'' A'' District where
the educational institution 'vas private or one not a
public institution. The amendment did not change that
aspect, it simply continu-ed it. The a1nendment, therefore, is no n1ore directed toward the University of Utah
than 'Yas the original ordinance, nor is it any more di.scriminator~7" against private schools or schools n6t falling within the characterization of a public educational
institution than was the original ordinance. All that was
accomplished by the amendment was to res1trict the
area in Residential "A" zone where fraternities or
sororities could be maintained.
Before the amendment was enacted by the City
Commission the proposed change was referred to the
Planning and Zoning Commission, consisting of rep·resenta:tive citizens of Salt Lake City, a commission
created under the provisions of the statutes authorizing
zoning. This Commission duly considered the advisability of the amendment by investigating on the ground
and considering the matter in one of iits meetings .. The
merits of the amendment were considered and its adoption recommended by· the Planning and Zoning Commission. The City Commission then advertised a public
hearing on the matter. At the hearing a greait number
of ·people were presenit and there expresse-d their views,
some in favor and some against the amendment. After
the hearing the City Commission passed the amendment (T. page 85-87).
Exhibit '' C'' i.s a copy of the minutes of the me·eting of the Planning and Zoning Commission at which the
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propos·ed amendment was considered. Exhibit ''A'' is a
copy of the p·etition addressed to the ·City Commission
by 26 residents living in the vicinity of the University
of Utah requesting the amendment here involved. It
also contains a copy of the recommendation of the Planning and Zoning Commission and the order of the City
Commission directing the advertising of notice of the
hearing to be held on the propose·d amendment. Exhibit
'' B '' is a copy of the minutes of the m·eeting
of the City Commission at which the- hearing on
ithe proposed amendment was held. The minute-s
of the Planning and Zoning Commission, Exhibit '' C,''
states that the Commission considered the matter of
''amending said ordinance so as to exclude such esta;..
blishments (fraternities and sororities) from that territory outside a 1/8 mile radius from the lands and
premises occupied by the inst~tution to which they are
incident, meaning in this case the University of Utah."
From this statem·ent in the minutes of th.e .Planning and
Zoning Commission plaintiffs conclude that th·e amending ordinance, as later passed, was directed solely toward and applied only to .the University of Utah. The
fact is that the University of Utah was, and still is,
the only ·public educational insltitution in Salt L.ake
City which p·ermits fraternities and sororities to be
organized among its students. It is. also true that the
advocates of the passage of the ordinance were residents in the neighborhood of the University of Utah,
but the language of the amendment as p-assed and
adop~ted by the City Commission is in no way limited
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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t.o the University of Utah but is applicable to any public
educational institution any,vhere in the City whenever
such institution is ereated.
The foregoing shows that the amended ordinance
complained of was given thorough and careful cons!- deratiQn by both the Planning and Zoning Commission
and by ·the City Commission and by the public before
it was adopted. There was a difference of opinion among
the persons expressing their views at the public hearing held to consider_ the matter. The amended ordinance
received the unanimous approval of both Commissions.
It stood unquestioned and unassailed for nearly 10 years,
until plaintiffs brought this action claiming it created
unlawful discrimination and was unreasonable, arbitrary
and capricious. It is very important, therefore, that
the particular position and status of each of the :plaintiffs now attacking the amended ordinance be reviewed
in the light of the record.
As to plaintiff Hatch the record shows that he acquired his home at 1363 Butler Avenue about 19'32, {T.
page 43) while the original ordinance was in effect permitting fraternities and sororities to locate in his neighborhood. At that time there were already several fraternities and sororities so located. At the time the
amendment was- adopted there had already located within the 600 foot area from the lands of the University
12 fraternities and sororities and 2 were located beyond
the 600 foot area. Exhibit ''D'' shows these fraternities
and sororilties existing at the tim·e the amended ordiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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nance was adopted, such houses being colored yellow.
Since 1939 only 2 sororities and 1 fraternity have lo . .
eated within the 600 foot area, one of which is on Butler
Street, being number 1386, the other being on Federal
Way and 1st South respectively, a considerable disitance
from Hatch's residence at 1363 Butler Avenue (T. page
69-70). These 3 houses are shaded brown on Exhibit
''D.'' No obj·ection was made by Hatch, or anyone else,
so far as the record shows to the location of these two
sororities and one fraiternity. The record is also silent
as to the likelihood as to any additional fraternities or
sororities locating in the fores·eeable future within this
600 foot area. On the contrary, lthe evidence is that the
plaintiff fraternity failed after 1 year of thorough search
by a special committee appointed for that purpose to
find a suitable house for sale within that area, and it was
for that reason that it purchased the home at 1175
Second Avenue in defiance of the p·rohibition of the
amended ordinance (T. page 71-72). ·So far as Hatch
is concerned, therefore, there is no evidence whatever
:that any additional fraternities or sororities are likely
to locate in the 600 foot area or that conditions within
this area app·ear likely to he changed to his detriment in
any manner whatsoever by reason of ithe imminency or
possibility of additional fraternities and sororities locating therein. Twelve of the 15 fraternities an·d sororities located -within this area were so located before the
amended ordinance was adopted and wi:thout being compelled so to do.
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Hatch's ohjection to the amended ordinance is that
should additional fraternities or sororities locate within
the 600 foot area there 'vill be additional ltraffic cong·estion ( T. page 44) and this 'vill p·rovide additional
arguments for establishing full year schools in Cedar
City and Carbon County, whereas, the University alum . .
nre wish to keep ''a concentrated large school here.''
As before stated, there is not the slighteslt evidence in
the record that any additional fraternities or sororities
contemplate locating in this 600 foot area or that there
are any houses or vacant lolt.s available to them for such
pu:r:pose. In harmony with the foregoing, the trial court
found, "There is no evidence that any fraternity or
sorority intends to or will or can now or at any time in
the future acquire premises within rthe area comp-rising
the 6QO foot limitation in said ordinance for use as a
fraternity or sorority house or that any further congestion or crowding of fraternity houses within said area
is imminent or threatened or is likely. That neither the
enforcement of the zoning
ordinance against the plain,
tiff fraternity's use of the property at 1175 Second
A venue as a fraternity house, nor the use of said pro~
perty as fraternity house will an anywise increase or
diminish or otherwise affect the congestion, noise or inconvenience or overcrowded condition already or otherwise present in the neighborhood of plaintiff Hatch's
residence, and the enforcement of said ordinance will
not be p·rejudicial to or discriminatory against plaintiff
Hatch or other property owners in Residential ''A''
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Dis~trict

who own property within 600 -feet of the lands
and premises occupied by the University of Utah.''

What are the facts as to the plaintiff fraternity
that give it standing in court to atttack the amended
ordinance~ This plaintiff had full knowledge of the fact
that under the ordinance a fraternity was not p:ermitted
in a Residential "A" District except within the 600
foot area. Notwithstanding such knowledge on August
27, 1948, it entered into a con!tract to purchase the house
at 117'5 Second Avenue, the purchase price being $35,000.00 (T. page 77), and th·ereupon occupied and still
con:tinues to occupy said premises as a fraternity house
bringing this action after it was threatened with ·prosecution ror violating the ordinance. The evidence further
shows that the frate·rnity could not find a hous·e wilthin
the 600 foot area suitable for its purposes and within
the reach of its financial resources although a house
could have been obtained for the sum of -$40,000.00 cash.
Plaintiff fraternity had no property rights p·rior to
the purchas·e of the -house on Second Avenue and it
acquired that property knowing thaJt its contemplated
use therof would be in violation of the ordinance.
Exhibit '' 1'' is a p·art of 'the use district map· covering ~salt Lake City under the zoning ordinance. The
red shaded area, with the exception of the rectangular
area immediately north of the University of Utah,
shaded green, and having pencil lines running -diagonally
across the same ('being the 600 fooit area of Residential
''A'' District here involved) is a portion of the ResidenSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tial '' B ~' Di3trict. This red shaded area ·extends from
Second East Street east to the University grounds, extending generally between 4th Avenue and 9th South
Street under the zoning ordinance. Fraternitie~ and
sororities are ·permitted within Residential '' B '' District.
It thus appears that an extensive area of lthe City has
been left open for the location therein of fraternities
and sororities.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PLAINTIFFS CAN ONLY RELY UPO·N THOSE
FEATURES OF THE ORDINANCE WHICH AFFECT THEM
IN THEIR PROPERTY RIGHTS AND ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH RIGHTS ARE AFFECTED.

We wish to refer the court first to a universal principle of consltitutional law that will-in itself dispose of
all clabps of unconstitutional discr~inations made by
the plaintiffs. It should be remembered, in this connection, that plaintiff fraternity acquired what interest it
has in the real property here involved with full knowledge of the existence of the Cirty ordinance and that
it prohibited the use of said prop:erty for a fraternity
house. As to it there can be no discrimination. It owned
no property when th·e ordinance was passed. It chose
to defy ;the ordinance and to put itself in the position
where it now elaims it is discriminated against; The ordinance was passed 10 years ago. Can it now be said that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a person who elects to disregard it 10, 15, or 50 years
after itB passage has any standing in court to say that
i~t discriminates against him?
The principle of constitutional law to which we refer
is stated in 16 C.J.S., page 179, Section 88, as follows:
''The unconstitutionality of a statute on the
ground that it denies equal righ·ts and privileges
by discriminating between persons or classes of
persons generally may not be raised by one not
belonging to the class allegedly discriminated
against.''
The same rule is stated in 11 Am Jur. Page 752,
Section 111, as follows:
''Even though a person may come within
the main purpose of a statute, he has no standing
to raise constitutional questions which do not directly affect him, for unless a party can show
that ·he himself has been wrongfully included in
the terms o£ a law, he can have no just ground
of compJaint. Hence; a litigant can be heard to
question the validity of a statute only when, and
in so far as, i·t is applied to his disadvantage.''

In 0'1'1onim v. Adams, 192 U.'S. 108, 28 L. Ed. 365,
the court held that a saloon keeper cannot challenge
the consti!tutionality of an ordinance excluding £emales
from saloons, ·Baying:
''What cause of action, then has plaintiff in
He is not a female, nor delegated to cham-

error~
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pion any grievances females may have under the
ordinance if they have any.''
Retz v. Leghsto·n, 10 Cal. App·. 685, 103 P. 363. In
this case it 'vas held that there where an ordinance
forbidding saloons except in certain defined limits of
the city, contained a proviso that existing hotels outside
such limits might conduct bars, one living outside such
limits, "\vho had no hotel erected either before or after

the passage of the ordinance, could not object that the
ordinance was void because it unreasonably discriminated between existing hotels and those thereafter built.

In Joseph Schllitz Brewing Co. v. City of Milwaukee,
286 N. W. 602, the sitatute impoaed an occupational tax
on operators of grain elevators and warehouses and exempted them from municipal or state taxation. It did
not impose the tax on owners of grain which is not
stored in warehouses or elevators. The City of Milwaukee attacked the statute claiming it unconstitutional ''because personal property owned by one !taxpayer and in
elevators or warehousea would he tax·ed thereunder
while the same kind of personal p-rop·erty owned by another but not in warehouses or elevators would be subject to personal property ttax.'' The court says:
''If there were discriminations, as contended
by the city, the city is not affected by ~the discrimination and has no standing to raise the constitutional point. This has been so frequently
heid that it needs no fuf'ther exposition here.''
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In Platt v. Phi~brick, 47 P. 2d 302, the statute permitted the lawful occupant of p·rivately owned lands
to take, hunt, or kill on such lands ·predaJtory or destructive birds or mammals and to possess ·and carry firearms within the boundaries of the game refuge. No
one ·else could kill such birds or animals or have or carry
firearms within the refuge. Plaintiff contended that the
protection ;to wild game afforded by the statute would
result in such an increase thereof that her garden might
be injured by the invasion of predatory birds and wild
life and that the_ statute was discriminatory between occupants against nonoccupants. The court held pJaintiff
could not urge this objection quoting from another decision as follows:
" 'It is well eatablished that a charge of unconstitutional discrimination can only be raised
in a case where this issue is involved in the de~
termination of the actioit, and then only by the
person or a member of the class of persons discriminated against. Estabrook- Co. v. Inc. Ace.
Com., 177 Cal. 767, 177 P. 848; 5 Cal. Jur. 622,
~sections 52, 5-3; 6 R. C. L·. 89, Sections 87, 88, 89;
12. C. J. 768, Section 189.' ''

Ex Barte Irish, 121 Kan. 72, 250 P. 1056, 61 A. L. R.332. Here Irish was convicted of violating a city ordinance ·of Holton, which p~rovided for p·ayment of a license fee of $150 per year hy any nonresident who sells
bread or bakery products in the city. Irish brought a
writ of habeas corp·us bu!t did not allege he was a nonresident. The court held that he could not rely on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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discrimination between residents and nonresidents say.
1ng:
"In 12 C. J. 760, the rule i.s ·declared to he
that 'it is a firmly established principle of law
~that the constitutionality of a statute may not he
attached by one whose rights are not affected by
the operation of the statute.'

''A large list of cases is there cited to sup··
port the statement quoted. 12 C. J. 768, says:
'The unconstitutionality of a statute, on the
ground that it denies equal rights and privileges
by discriminating between persons or classes of
persons, may not be raised by one not belonging
to the class alleged to be disGriminated against.' ''
In Heald v. District of 0-o·lumbia, 66 L. Ed. 853,
259 U.S. 114, the District of Colunihia levied a tax of a
cel"tain per cent of the yalue of intangible prop'erty~ of
persons resident or engaged in business within the District. The executors of Peters' estate paid the tax under
protest and brought suit to recover it back, claiming ~e
act void becans·e it required every nonresident who
engages in business in the District to pay the_ tax on
all property wheresoever siltuated. ·The. Supreme Court
held this objection was of no avail to the executors
since all property of the estate was located in the District
and the owners are residents within lthe District, saying:
''It has been repeatedly held that one who
would strike down a state statute as violative of
the F·ederal Cons~titution must show that he is
within the class of p·ersons with respect to whom
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the act is unconstitutional, and that the alleged
unconstitutional feature injures him.''
This same rule is stated by Judge Brandeis in
Premier-Pabst S~ales ·Co. v. Grosscwp·, 80 L. Ed. 1155,
298 U. S. 2·26, as follows:
''We have no occ~sion ;to consider the constitutional question, because it appears .that plaintiff is without standing to present it. One who
would strike down a state statute as ·obnoxious
to the Federal Constitution, must show that the
alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.''
Our Supreme Court in Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stew·art,
82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 231, recognized this rule. There
plaintiff, who was not engaged in selling alcohol but
would only be a purchaser, contended the sltatute creating the state alcohol warehouse and giving the warehouse manufacturer a monoply on the sale of alcohol
was invalid. The court says :
'' Plain;tiff contends the law is unreasonable
and discriminatory. If this were true, we do not
see how pila.intiff can lawfully complain, since
there is no discrimination against it or other manufacturers who use alcohol, since all are ·subject
to the same regulations. Plaintiff is not one who
seeks to sell in compeit;ition with the manager, but
a user who is afforded an opportunity to pur..
chase through or from the warehouse manager.
The only manner in which plaintiff and others
similarly situated claim to be injured is that they
are required to pay a higher p~rice for alcohol because of the charges authorized by ·s.taitute to be
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collected by the manager, and the fees imposed
by rules and regulations of the Attorney General
and the Governor. In no other \vay does plaintiff allege it is injured in its property or rights."
The ease of Wu.lfshon v ..Brwden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150
N.E. 120, 43 A. L. R. 651, involved a zoning ordinance.
The plaintiff sought to erect an apartment house and
attacked ~the ordinance requiring a certain setback from
the street and a certain backyard. The court says :
"Appellant complains ~that the regulations
for setbacks are unreasonable because they do
not graduate such setbacks to the size of the
building but require the same area for a small
as for a large building. Such an argument is
not available to him. The only question which
he is entitled to argue is rthat these setbacks are
unreasonable in the case of a building four and
five stories high and designed to accommodate
nearly 600 p~eople. It will be time enough to consider whether they should not be reduced in the
case of a smaller building when somebody de-siring to- erect such smaller building. complains
of them as unreasonable.''
The_ case of Heimerle v. Village of Bronxville, 5
N.Y. S. 2d 1002, involved a zoning ordinance and will
be quoted from extensively later in this brief as, in our
opinion, it disposes of plaintiffs' case a.s a whole. On
the question now being discusse-d the court says :
''The fact that other pro!)erty within the 200
foot distance in other locations may be unreasonably affected, if such fact exists, does not aid
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the plaintiffs. The only question which the plaintiffs are entitled to argue is that the restriction
is unreasonable as applied to this property. The
burden of proof on that subject has not been sustained by the plain tiffs.''
While we !think the rules of law enunciated by the foregoing authorities dispose of plaintiffs' case we shall
proceed to answer their arguments as made under subdivisions A, B, C, D, E and F of their brier. We ·Bhall
, consider each of these· subdivisions under Point II.
POINT II.
PLAINTIF'FS HAVE GIVEN THE ORDINANCE AN
ERRONEOUS :CONS,TRUCTION UNDER SUBDIVISIONS A,
B, C, D, E AND F O·F THEIR BRIEF, AND IN ADDITION
ARE NO·T ENTITLED TO URGE THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATORY FEATURES THEREIN AS8ERTED.

A

The ordinance, subsection (a) prohibits all uses excep·t those specified therein, for it ·says that in '' Residential ''A'' District no building or p~remises shall be
used or maintained, etc., for other than one of the following uses.,'' naming them specifically. This all inclusive
prohibition is then modified in subsection (b) so as to
permit uses which are ordinarily appurtenant to the
uses specified in ·subs·ection (a) such as are specifically
mentioned in lth·e succeeding subdivisions numbered 1
to 7, inclusive. When subdivision 6 refers to dormitories,
fraternity or ·sorority houses occupied only hy the faculty
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of students of public .eduoat~onal institutions, that opens
·the prohibition in subsection (a) only to the extent expressed, namely, these houses must he occupied only
by faculty or students of !public e•ducational institutions.
This clearly does not permit fraternities in Residential
''A'' District incident to private schools. Plaintiffs not
only concede, but argue that the .word ''schools,'' a p,ermitted use under subsection (a), include both private
and public schools. When the incidental us-e permitted
under subdivision 6 by its language only refers t:o public
educational institutions it is p·erfectly clear that the City
authorities were permitting fraternities in a Residen!t.ial
''A'' District only when incident to a public school. If
subsection (a) already permitted fraternities in Residential ''A'' District as a part of a ''school'' the:ve would
be no need at all of ·Bubsection (b,6) to grant the right.
We admit there is a distinction made in the ordinance..
between fraternity houses incident lt:o public schools and
those incident to private schools, the former being permitted and the latter prohibited. If it be claimed thaJt
this ·distinction involves an unconstitutional discrimination, neither of the plainltiffs is in a position to urge
it, under the law cited above, as neither iB a private
school, nor is ·either a fraternity seeking to come into
Residential "A" District as an incidenlt to a p·rivate
school. Furthermore, there is no showing that the distinction is an unreasonable one, the burden of proof
being upon the plaintiff to make such showing.

.
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B

Under subdivision B of their brief plaintiffs likewise misconstrue the ordinance and they say that the
ordinance permits without limitation the number of
boarde'rs or lodgers who may live in a two-family dwelling. In S·ection (a) every use is prohibited other than
one-family dwellings, two-family dwellings, etc. Neither
the words ''one-family dwelling'' nor the words ''ftwofamily dwelling'' contemplates a use of a dwelling to
hous-e boarders or lodgers. Without subdivision 5 of subsection (b) the use of any dwelling for boarders or lodgers would be absolutely forbidden in Residential ''A''
District. Subdivision 5 so far removes this ban as to
permit 6 boarders or lodgers in a one-family dwelling,
bult · ,e)rpressly says that such p-rovision does not apply
to a two-family dwelling, and hence no boarders or lodgers are permitted in a two-family residence in Residential ''A''' District That the foregoing is the proper construction of subsection (a) is shown by the fact !that
under S·ection 6717 (a-2) of the 1944 Revised Ordinance·s,
boarding or lodging houses for the first time are made
permissible in Residential '' B '' and '' B-2''' Districts.
There ·is, therefore, no discrimination beltween twofamily dwellings and fraternity houses, assuming that
a ·fraternity house is an equivalent of a boarding or
lo'dging house, as no hoarders or lodgers are p~ermissible
in a two-family dwelling in Residental ''A'' District.
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C, D, EAND F
~Tith

respect fo subdivisions C, D, E, and F of
plaintiffs' brief, we submit the authorities hereinafter
ap~arin~. ,,. . e desire to add here the following:
As to subdivision '' C,'' plaintiff Hatch is not any
more discriminated agains:t than any other person who
finds himself in a particular zone where other uses than
one-famly or two-family uses are permitted. If there are
residences in a commercial zone, there is the natural subjection to new and additional commercial enterp·rises
coming into the area Ito the detriment of the residential
feature. Yet commercial zones are s·elected and confined
in many instances to small areas as was the case in
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, hereinafter cited and quoted.
The ordinance attached does not confine fraterniities to
a 600 foot area. Fraternities are permissible in R·esidential '' B '' area to lthe west, northwest, and southwest of
the University. The City ia under no obligaJtion to so
establish fraternity zones as will provide already built
houses ·auitable for fraternities. As a matter of fact
the evidence discloses there are no more houses available within the 600 foot area and lthat the plaintiff fraternity for that reason went outside that area. Allother fraternities were established without any action
being ltaken by plaintiff Hatch. ·To strike the ordinance
down in this case will not in any wise relieve Hatch.
All the fraternities and sororities that could locate
within the 600 foot area have already done ·Bo and· all
but two did so while the entire area of Residential ''A''
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was open and available to them. To reopen Residential
''A'' to fraternities and sororities will not prevent new
ones from locating within the 600 foot area if a sui!table
house can there be obtained. The ordinance fixing the
600 foot limitation was passed in January, 1939. No action
was taken by Hatch during the ten year interval against
this ordinance. Neither the complainlt nor the evidence
shows any necessity now for his taking the present action
for the evidence· shows that the plaintiff fraternity could
not and did not acquire a hou·se wiithin the 600 foot limitation. Consequently the-re is no threat now of any addi..
tional burden upon Hatch. So whether the fraternity
should he p·ermitted to use the house on is:econd Ave..
nue for a chapter is of no concern to Hatch. Striking
down the ordinance will not cause any of the fraternities already located to move. There will be just as much
traflic congestion and other disturbances incident to fraternities and sororities in Hatch's neighborhood regardless of. whether the plaintiff fraternity is or is not permitted in· the Second Avenue house. There is no evidence
that any other fraternity is threaJtening to invade this
600 foot area while the evidence is to the effect that there
is no house now available within that area for a fraJternity. The. evidence further discloses that there are numerous houses in close proximity to the University in
Residential '' B '' which are of such a character as to
be suitable for fraternilties and sororities. There is
absolutely no ·showing, therefore, why the extraordinary
remedy of injunction should be invoked in this case in
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behalf of plaintiff Hatch or why the ordinance should
be declared invalid as to him.
- As to subdivision D of p~aintiffs' brief, all we need
to say is that ~the ordinance was passed by the City Commission and what was intended must be drawn from the
language of the ordinance itself. No mention is made
therein of the University of Utah. The language is
general and would apply to any public ·educational institution, now or hereafter established, in a Residential ''A'' District. The fact that for the time being the
University is the only such institution where fraternities
and sororities are organized and have chapter houses
cannot be taken as evidence that the ordinance was directed toward the University and applicable only to fraternities and sororities of that instiltution. Salt Lake
City is the only first class city in the State of Utah.
Is it to be contended that all legislation concerning first
class cities is for that reason directed to Salt Lake City
alone and is, therefore, class legislation and so void~
As to subdivision E and F of plaintiffs' brief we
feel that the authorities hereinafter referred to amply
answer the contentions ma:de by counsel.
It is apparent that the two plaintiffs in this case
occupy conflicting positions. The fraternity asserts that
there is no such distinction in law or fact between houses
occupied by fraternities and houses occupied by one
or two families as would form a reasonable basis for
separate treatment of fraternities by the ordinance.
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triment to a strictly residential district and create conditions which should not he permitted to exist in such
district. He claims the location of fraternities in his
neighborhood has materially reduced the value of his
property and the future location of fraternities will
destroy the value thereof. This clearly shows that there
is a reasonable basis for treating fraternities as a class
in fixing proper zoning restrictions. The sam~ considerations are present as regards fraternities in a strictly
residential area as are present in lodging or boarding
houses in such an area.
-

'

POINT III
GREEK LETTER FRATERNITY, MAY BE EXCLUDED
FRO·M RESIDENTIAL DISTRICT UNDER ZONING LAW.
Pet~is

v. Alpha AZpha Chapter ~of Phi Bet.a Pi, 115
Neb. 525, 213 N. W. 835. 'The fraternity entered into an
agreement to purchase a large residence piroperty for
the sum of $2·5,000 paying $:6000 down and giving a
mortgage for the halance. The prop·erty was located
in residential A district which permitted only one and
two family dwellings, churches, schools, libraries, parks,
playgrounds, farming and truck gardens,· hospitals or
institutions of an educational philanthropic eleemosynary nature, and accessory buildings. The fraternity
argued that the owner had a right to sell the prope·rty
to the fraternity for the exclusive residential use as a
family withl.n the meaning of the city ordinance.
"The ordinance, however, does not ap·pear
to uphold counsel's construction of the word
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'fan1ily' as used -in the above cited ''A'' residence
district section. Has it come to ·pass that a company of approximately 20 or 30 unrelated young
faternity men ran properly come 'vithin the generally arrepted n1eaning of the social uni~t which
is designated as a family~ We do not think so .
. .t\nd counsel's contention in respect of the familyrights feature of the defendant fraternity is
plainly negatived by the express provision that
"fraternities', and other designated occupants as
well, may be installed under the 'B' section of
the ordinance. Clearly the fraternity is confined
to the 'B' section.
''Plaintiffs point out that, if the judgment of
the trial coUitt is sustained, the students will lodge
in the Allis-on house and be served with two meals
each day. And, of course, from time to time, more
room will be added to accommodate the future
influx of students in attendance at a large, influential and rapidly growing university. Plain'tiffs also contend that such use of the house 'will
cause confusion on account of the numbers living
in said house ; will depreciate the value of the
plaintiffs' ·p·rop·erty, and other property in the
neighborhood; will cause .confusion because of
the p~escence of automobiles owned by members
of said fraternity, and because of the proximity
of the plaintiffs, the firs't named plaintiff being
within 20 feet of said house and the others being
immediately across the street therefrom plaintiffs will be specially damaged,' by reason of its
proximity. It is shown that 'these ~three homes
are all of the value of over ·$50,000 each, and are
typical of the district,' and that many like residences will be greatly depreciated in value in the
event that the defendants prevail in this suit.
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''Plaintiffs gladly concede in the brief that
the proposed young men occupants of the defendant fraternity house are high-class and well-behaved in their demeanor. But it will be presumed
that they are not different from any equal number of young men students in somewhat similar
situations at the other seats of learnings. Hannan v. Harper, 189 Wis. 588, 208 N. W. 255, 45
A. L. R. 1119, is a case arising in Milwaukee
wherein the court made this observation:
'' 'The occupancy of the upper flat of the
dwelling house as headquarters and clubrooms
of a college fraternity amounts to a constructive
eviction of the tenant of the lower flat and a
breach of an implied covenant for quiet enjoyment, entitling the tenant to an injunction to
restrain such breach. '
"And in the statement of facts, at page 256
(189 "\Vis. 589'), sp·eaking of college students generally, the court observed that it is a matter of
common knowledge and well established that
groups of students are for the most part ·exuberant, boisterous, and hilarious, and that they do
not ordinarily keep regular hours and are addicted to the use and abuse of vibrant and sonorous musical instruments.
''In a zoning case decided in 1925, the_ question of the police . power as relating thereto is
discussed at length, and the court, in an unusually
instructive opinion, say:
'' 'The police power, as such, is not confined within the narrow circumscription of ·precedents, resting upon past conditions which do
not cover and control p·resent-day· conditions obviously calling for revised regulations to promote the health, safety, morals, or general weiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fare of the public; that is to say, as a commonwealth develops politically, economically, and
socially, the police power likewise develop~s, within reason, to meet the changed and changing conditions. What was at one time regarded as an im·p·roper exercise of the police p·ower may now, because of changed living conditions, be recognized
as a legitimate exercise of that power. ~ * * In
its inception the police power was closely concerned with the preservation of the public peace,
safety, morals, and health without specific regard for 'the general welfare.' The increasing
complexity of our civilization and institutions
later gave rise to cases wherein the promotion
of ·the public welfare, was held by the courts to
be a legitimate object for the exercise of the police
power. As our civic life has developed, so has the
definition of 'public welfare,' until-it has heen
held to embrace regulations 'to ~promote the economic welfare, public convenience and general
prosperity of the community.' Miller v. Board of
Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381, 38 A. L. R.
1479."
The court reversed judgment for the fraternity
enjoining the City from enforcing the ordinance.
The above case was followed in the case of o·ity of
Limcoln v. Loga.'Yir--Jones, 120 Neb. 827, 235 N.W. 583,
where it was held that a Greek letter fraternity violates
the zoning ordinance.s of a city when it occupies and
uses in an exclusive residential district a residence as
a chapter house.
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POINT IV
THE \VISDO·M AND NECESSITY FOR THE ZONING,
THE NUMBER AND NA'TURE OF THE DISTRICTS CREATED, AND THE BOUNDARIES THER.EOF AND THE
USES PERMITTED THEREIN ARE M~TTERS WHICH LIE
WITHIN THE DISCRETION OF THE GOVERNING BODY
OF THE CITY.

Under ~s~ection 15-8-90 U.C.A. 1943 the legislature
has vested broad p~o.wer and discretion in the governing body of the city in establishing zoning regulations
and use districts. We quote :
'' 15-8-90. Districts.
'' Fnr any or all of said p·urposes the legislative body may divide the municipality into districts of such number, shape and area as may be
deemed best suited to carry out the purposes of
this article, and within such districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings
or structures, or the use of land. All such regulations shall be uniform for each class or kind
of buildings throughout each district, but the
regulations in one district may differ from those
in other districts.''
Ma;rshall v. Salt Lake c·ity, 141 P. 2d '704. ·This case
lays down the point above stated and states that:

''Unless the action of such body is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or un·reasonable or clearly offends some provision of the constitution or statute, the court must uphold it if within the grant
of powe-r to the municipality. It is primarily
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the duty of the city to 1nake the classifications if
a clasaification is reasonably doubtful. The judgment of the court "~ill not be substituted for the
judg~nent of the city. The requiremenl tha,t zoning be by disf1~icts does not require that dist.ricts
be conf,ined a.nd rigitdly limli,ted to one p~articvula,r
type of 1.tse/'
On the question of what is a reasonable exercise

of the police power, the court saya:
''The p·reservation of the public health, morals, safety and welfare are not to be -determined
or gauged in dollars and cents alone, nor in p·rotection from contagious diseases or moral charlatans. The public health involves the preservation of the mental, moral, and civic health of the
inhabitants as well as physical health. A citizenry
mentally alert and alive to the interests of the
city and its ~abitants, filled with pride and
confidence in ·the community and nation, awake
to its weaknesses, needs and , possibilities, is as
much a matter of p·ublic concern and effort, as
is the prevention of epidemics. Again, a mentally healthy and alert citizenship is one of the
most effective ways of preserving the physical
health. So, too, the moral health of the p.eople is
a matter of grave public concern. The higher the
sense of public responsibility, of private eitizens
and public officers alike, the greater the assurance of safety in person, liberty, and property.
The higher the. moral tone, the morale of the
people, the cleaner will be the city, the more beautiful the homes and parks ; the more peace and
quiet that abounds, the greater the joy and life
and living in the community. The public health,
safety, morals, and welfare, as those terms are
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used with reference to government and its exercise of police power are insep·arably linked to,
and founded upon, the peace of mind, happiness
and contentment of its citizens. A government
such as ours is merely a form for cooperative
action, set up by free men, to enable them to live
and operate as a unit, insuring the preservation
to each of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and imposing only such restrictions upon
the individual as shall be necessary to p·res·erve
and p·rotect the welfare of society as a whole. A
chain is no stronger than its weakest link, so
society is no better or stronger than the units
of, and upon, which it is builded. The unit upon,
and out of which our present society is built is
the family and the home. A basic and very important element in determining public welfare,
especially as applied to regulations and restrictions governing residences and residential property, is its need or effect upon the homes ana
home life of the people. It is certainly the p~rerog
ative, and probably the duty of organized society,
to take those measures and do those things which
tend to preserve in their beauty, integrity and
social force, the homes and homelife of its citizens. Those things, therefore, which contribute
or reasonably may contribute to the convenience
and enjoyment. of the family home, and the homelife of the p·eople generally, in such a way as may
affect their health, safety, morals and gene'ral
welfare are within the scope of the police power,
and may properly. form the basis for action by
the city in zoning.
''As to what restrictions and limitations
should be imposed upon prop~erty, and what uses
thereof should be pe·rmitted, has been hy tlie
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cretion of the governing body of the city. As
long as that body atays within the grant, and purposes fixed by the legislature, the courts will not
gainsay (its) judgment. In Walton v. Tracy
Loan & Trust Co., 97 Utah 249, 92· P. 2d 724,
726, we said: 'No one would doubt that the exercise of the zoning power is definitely a legislative function and activity.'
"The court, in Zahn v. Board of Public
Works, 195 Cal. 497, 234 P. 388, at page 395,
says: ' It must be conceded that, where a given
situation admittedly presents a proper field for
the exercise of the police power, the extent of the
invocation and application is -a matter which lies
very largely in legislative discretion (State ex
rel.) (Carter v. Harper, 182 Wis. 149·, 196 N.W.
451) (33 A.L.R. 269'), and we are well satisfied
that the weight of authority dealing with the subject of zoning may now be regarded as establishing that 'every intendment is to he made in favor
of zoning ordinances, and courts will not, except
in clear cases, interfere with exercise of power
thus manifested.'
''And in Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty, supra, we read: 'If the validity of the legislative
classification * * * be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control.' ''

Wilkins v. City iof San

Be~r.ward'ino,

175 P. 2d 542.

''Plaintiff sought declaratory relief, claiming that the zoning ordinance of the city of San
Bernardino was unreasonable and invalid as applied to the west 112 feet of his p·roperty because
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cated in a small or 'spot' business zone which is
in the center of a large residential district, zoned
for single family dwellings. Plaintiff, in substance, is attempting to obtain an extension of
one arm of this small business zone by judicial
decree, contrary to the legislative determination
by which the boundaries of the zone were established.''
Plaintiff had erected multiple dwellings and garages
on the middle portion of the lots east of the disputed
westerly 112 feet. He applied twice for re-zoning which
was denied and then obtained a permit to erect single
family two-story dwellings and garages on the west 112
feet of these lots. Instead of erecting single family
dwellings, however, he erected two multiple family units
in violation of the zoning ordinance.
''In the p·resent case, there is no contention
that the zoning ordinance as a whole is invalid,
but only that its application to part of plaintiff's
property is unreasonable and hence we must assume, in accordance with the rule that every intendment is in favor of the validity of such ordinances, that the enactment as a whole is a p·roper
·exercise of the police power and adapted to p·romote the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Th,is being so, the sole question
is whether the ap·plication of the ordinance to
plaintiff's property is so oppressive and unreasonable as to justify the granting of relief, o:r
whether there was any reasonable justification
for the legislation as applied to p1aintiff's property so as to make the action of the city in
denying plaintiff's applications for re-zoning, a
legitimate exercise of the police power. A city
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cannot unfairly discriminate against a particular
parcel of land, and the courts may properly inquire as lt;o whether the scheme of classification
has been applied fairly and impartially in each
instance. Reynolds v. Barrett, 12 Cal. 2d 244,
251, 83 P. 2d 29. But the mere fact that some
hardship is experienced is not material, since
'Every exercise of the police power is apt to
affect adversely the property interest of somebody.' Zah.n v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal.
497, 512, 234 P. 388, 394. It is implicit in the
theory of police power that an individual cannot
complain of incidental injury, if the power is
exercised for prop-er purposes- of public health,
safety, morals and general welfare, and if there
is no arbitrary and unreasonable application in
the _particular case.
"Where it is claimed that the ordinance is
unreasona:ble as applied to plaintiff's p·roperty,
o·r that a change in conditions has rendered application of the ordinance unreasonable, it is incumbent on plaintiff to produce sufficient evidence
from which the court c-an make such findings aa
to the physical facts involved as will' justify it
in concluding, as a matter of law, that the ordinance is unreasonable and invalid. It is not sufficient for him to show that it will he more profitable to him to make other use of his property,
or that such other use will not cause injury to
the public, but he must show an abuse of discretion on the p·art of the zoning authorities and
that there has be·en an unreasonable and unwarranted exercise of the police power. See Rehfeld
v. City, etc. of San Francisco, 218 Cal. 83, 85, 21
P. 2d 41'9. Every intendment is in favor of the
validity of the exercise of police power, and, even
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ation of the legislative body, if there is a reasonable haais for the belief that the esta;blishment
of the strictly residential district has substantial
relation to the public health, safety, morals or
general welfare, the zoning measure will be
deemed to. be within the purview of the police
power. Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal. 2d 341, 344,
115 P. 2d 455; Miller v. Board of Public Works,
195 Cal. 477, 490, 2·34 P. 381, 38 A. L. R. 1479;
Zahn v. Board of Public Works, _195 Cal. 497,
234 P. 388; see Otis v. City of Los Angeles, 52
Cal. App. 2d 605, 614, 126 P. 2d 954.
'' The courts cannot write the zoning laws
and cannot say that the legislative body has
erred in drawing the lines of the districts, or in
restricting the territory devoted to business or
to multiple dwellings, unless there is a clear
showing of abuse of legislative discretion, i.e.,
that the restrictions are unreasonable: A-s stated
in Miller v. Board of Public Works, 19'5 Cal. 477,
493, 495, 234 P. 381, 387, 38 A. L. R. 1479, 'The
man who is seeking to ·establish a permanent
home would not deliberately choose to build next
to an apartment house, and it is common experience that the man who has already built is dissatisfied with his home location and desires a
change. * * * Somewhere the line of demarcation must be drawn, and it is primarily the p•rOvince of the municipal body to which the zoning
function is committed to draw that line of demarcation, and it is neither the province nor the duty
of courts to interfere with the discretion with
which such bodies are invested in the absenc·e of
a clear showing of an abuse of that discretion.
In short, as previously indicated, we are not permitted to substitute ·our judgment for the legislative judgment.'
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''So-called 'spot' zoning results in th·e creation of two types of 'islands.' As pointed out
above, the objectionable type arises when the
zoning· authority improperly limits the use which
may be made of a small parcel located in the
center of an unrestricted area. The second type
of 'island' results when most of a large district
is devoted to a limited or restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in one or more 'spots'
in the district. It is the second type of 'island'
that is presented in this case and if there is any
discrimination, it is in favor of the 'island' since
it may be devoted to a greater number of uses
than the surrounding territory. It is clearly
within the discretion of the legislative body of
the city to determine whether such an 'island'
should be enlarged or not, and the mere fact that
the owner may enjoy greater benefits, or that
his property will be enhanced in value, if the
size of the island is increased, cannot entitle him
to compel the allowance of such increase in size.
Herfeld v. City, etc., of San Francisco, 218 Cal.
83, 21 P. 2d 419; See Otis v. City of Los Angeles,
52 Cal. App. 2d 605, 126 P. 2·d 954; Kort v. ·City
of Los Angeles, 52 ·Cal. App. 2d 804, 127 P~ 2d
66; Rubin v. Board of Directors, 16 Cal. 2d 119,
104 P. 2d 1041. Zoning necessarily involves
boundary problems and, when 'spots'· zoning is
permitted in a residential district, the legislative body must determine where the boundary
is to be placed, attempting, as far a:s possible,
to minimize the resu1ting inconvenience. This is
essentially a legislative problem, and the determination may be attacked only if there is no reasonable basis therefor. Often there may be little difference in the character of the property on either
side of the line, but ·such showing will not justify
a judicial alteration or extension of the boundaries.
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If an owner could compel the extension of the
boundaries of the 'island,' by any such showing,
then the next adjoining owner in turn could likewise make the same kind of a showing and obtain
another extension of the 'island' to his property,
and in a short time there would be an end to the
effectivness of all zoning legislation.''
T~aimtor

v. Bat:temer, 72 N. Y. 'S~. 2d 537. Plaintiff
brought an action under the Declaratory Judgments
Acts to have a zoning ordinance declared invalid. The
plaintiffs further complain that the zoning change made
by the Town Board wherein the land herein referred
to, including the portion of the 'roadway,' was changed
from a residential zone to an industrial zone, was done
arbitrarily and unreasonably and constitutes an unreasonable, illegal, confiscatory exercise of zoning power
and that the change of zone deprives the plaintiffs of
their prop·~rty without due process of law and denies
plaintiffs the equal p·rotection of the laws.
''With respect to the change of zone, it must
be remembered that the action of the Town Board
complained of constituted a legislative act. No
machinery for the review of the action of the
Town Board in making change in the zoning ordinance is provided in the Town Law, the reason
therefor being that within constitutional limits
the Town Board is the sole judge as to what law
·should be enacted for the protection and welfare
of the people and as to when the police power
which it possesses is to be exercised. It is true that
an exercise of the police power will be scrutinized
by the courts to determine whether or not it is
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bitrarily deprives a p·erson of the use of hia
property. So long as the action of the Town
Board does not infringe upon. the inherent rights
of life and liberty and the enjoyment of property,
either directly or through some limitation thereon, a determination as to the necessity for the
exercise of the police power is conclusive upon
the court. The discretion of the legislative body
is very broad and become.s the subject of supervision by the court only when it becomes necessary to ·determine whether or not it has been
exercised within proper limitations. Green Point
Savings Bank , v. Board of Zoning Apip·eals of
Town of Hempstead, 281 N.Y. 534, at pages 539,
540, 24 N.E. 2d 319, at pages 321, 322. No facts
are alleged in the complaint showing that the
Town Board exercised its ·power.s beyond the
proper ·limitations or that its action was unreasonable and arbitrary. The plaintiffs" by this
form of relief seek to obtain in this action the
determination that the zoning change was made
illegally. ·There is no claim that the procedure
adopted in making the change was improper.
The plaintiffs merely claim that the result of the
change was not in the best interests of the p·laintiffs and others similarly situated.
''No reported case in this State has been
drawn to the attention of the court wherein any
court has reviewed by declaratory judgment such
a determination as was made by the Town Board
in this case. True, in M·atter of Dowsey v. Villageof Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 177 N.E. 427, 86
A.L.. R. 642, the court p·ermitted a taxpayer to
attack a zoning ordinance by way of a declaratory judgment. But as to that ca.se the Court of
Appeals in Arverne Bay Construction Comp·any ·
v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, at page 226, 15 N.E.
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2d 587, at page 589, 117 A.L.R. 1110, narrowed
its construction as follows :
" 'The rule established by that case is this:
To sustain an attack upon the validity of the
ordinance an aggrieved property owner must
show that if the ordinance is enforced the consequent restrictions upon his property preclude
its use for any purpose to which it is re·asonably
adapted.'
''There are no allegations whatsoever in the
complaint herein to indicate that the plaintiffs
are unable to use their property for any purpose
to which it is reasonably adapted.
''In the exercise of sound discretion, the
court deems the various issues here involved no~
to be subject of a declaratory judgment. The discretionary power of the court in an action for
a declaratory judgment should be invoked only
where a resort to ordinary actions or proceedings
would not afford adequate relief. Rockland Light
& Power Co. v. City of New York, 289 N.Y. 45,
43 N.E. 2d 803.''
POINT V
·THE PRESUMPTION IS THAT THE ZONING ORDINANCE IS VALID AND THE BURDEN IS ON THE ONE
CHA·LLENGING THE ORDINANCE TO PROVE ITS INVALIDITY.

Repp. v. Shahadi, 132 N. J. L. 24, 38 A. 2d 284.

''It is now well established that where a
zoning ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the
powers granted by the- zoning statute, within the
purview of the zoning amendment to the constiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tution, the muncipal enactment will be ·sustained.
The presumption is that the regulations are reasonable unless the contrary is shown.''

Pass v. Town

~of

Bloomfield, 49' A. 2d 476.

The defendant town amended its zoning ordinance to create a new zone classified as a garden type ap·artment residential zone. The property affected comprised 21 acres, being a part
of Lot 1, Block 970, and used as a small public
golf course. It was bounded on the north by
farm land, on the south by Glen Ridge Golf
Course, on the east by Third. River and on the
west by Glen Ridge Golf Course. The property
was zoned for 1 family dwellings. The court says
''we find no evidence to overcome the presumption of validity."
Zadwotr'YIIJ} v.

~City

:of Chicago, 380 Ill. 470, 44 N.E.

2d 426.

''.An ordinance enacted in the exercise of
power confered upon a municip~ality enjoys a presumption in favor of its validity, and it is incumbent upon one attacking it as unreasonable
and oppres·sive to show affirmatively and cle'arly
that such charge is true.''
De Bartolo v. Village :of O·ak Park, 396 Ill. 404, 71
N.E. 2d 693.

Plaintiff sought to convert her single family residence into a 2 family residence. Her property was within
50 feet of prop•erty zoned as comm·ercial. There were
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dences, but these were constructed and so used before
passage of the zoning ordinance. The commercial zone
was separated from the 1 family residence area by a
16 foot area. Plaintiff contends that since there were
already some 2 family residences in the same block as
her property and that a portion of the block ·south of the
alley was zoned for commercial use renders the ordinance invalid as to her property. The court says:
''A zoning· ordinance is presumed to be valid.
The burden is upon the one assailing such an ordinance to overcome this assumption . . . It is
axiomatic that zoning must begin somewhere and
end somewhere. Some property in a commercial
zone must be near, or even adjoin property in a
residential zone. The very nature of a zoning
ordinance requires that certain desirable neighborhoods adjoin others which are less desirable.
There is no evidence in the record touching the
question of any diminution in the value of plaintiff's prop·erty because it is zoned for single family residence purposes.''
Dupage ·C.ournty v-. Hernderson, 83 N.E. 2d 720.

''The ordinance is presumed to be valid, and
the burden of showing it unreasonable and opp·ressive, as applied to app·ellants, rested upon
them. Their showing had to be clear and conclusive. All that they have shown is that they
purchased the property knowing it was subject
to the zoning ordinance restriction against carrying on a manufacturing business thereon. The
violation of the ordinance is admitted. They have
not shown that the particular restriction, as ap...
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plied to then1, is not a proper exercise of the
police power in th·at it does not have a substantial relation to the general welfare of the people
about them.
''The fact the ordinance permitted a large
number of uses within the district, "'rhich the appellants deemed more detrimental to the p•eople
and their property, can neither diminish nor
enlarge their defense, for those other uses are
not theirs. The fact that nonp.ermissive uses ·ar~
carried on by others contrary to the ordinanc~
neither fortifies nor weakens the case of appellants, but each alleged violation of the ordinance
is a complete case within itself and must stand
or fall upon the facts and circumstances of that
case alone. The appellants charge in this court
that the classification of their property as nonindustrial in the ordinance amounts to a capri.A
cious invasion and an unreasonable invasion of
their property rights. The !presumption .of the
validity of that classification must be overcome by
proof made by defe'ndants w·hich is cZe:ar a;nd
convinc!irng. City of Springfield v. Vancil, 398 Ill.
575, 7·6 N.E. 2d 471. The defendants have not supplied the proof required. The uses permitted
and forbidden in the '' F'' district were the result
of the considered judgment of the zoning commission and the board of supervisors, all based
upon a survey and analysis of the area involved
by competent persons. The fact such judgment
may lead to an honest difference of opinion, which
leaves the subject open for debate, does not warrant this court intruding in the role of a zoning
commission. All questions concerning the wi·sdom ·or desirability of particular restrictions in
a zoning ordinance must be addressed to the
legislative body specifically cha·rged with determSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1n1ng them. Evanston Best & Co. v. Goodman,
369 Ill. 207, 1'6 N .E. 2d 131.''

Yoemans v. Hillsb·ovrough, tp. 135· N.J.L. 599, 54 A.
2d 202.

''One attacking a zoning ordinance as unreasonable is met by the presumption that the
ordinance i.s reasonable and must bear the burden
of establishing the contrary.''

Dundee Realty Co. v. City of Omaha, 13 N.W. 2d
634. In this case experts testified that the natural development of the area required that plaintiff's tract be_
made commercial instead of '' AA'' Residen:tial District
since it fronted upon a through highway whereon 9660
. veh~cles passed daily, creating a lot of noise and damage; that it was unsuited for residential purposes; that
a shopping center would be a convenience as the nearest
is 3000 feet distant; that the plaintiff's property would
be cheapened by erection of one family residences; that
its value for commercial uses would be from $50,000 to
$91,800 while without plaintiff's proposed development
it would only. he from $1500 to $13,000 ... The defendants ·showed the surrounding prop·erty was built up
by fine homes ; that these properties would be greatly
depreciated in value if the area was commercial; that
there was already more than sufficient commercial area
for the city; that nearby was a Catholic Church, a public
park, the University of Omaha, a coeducational school.
The court concluded the zoning of plaintiff's property
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as Residential '' AA'' was not arbitrary or un·reasonable
.
saJing:
"In determining the validity of a city ordinance regularly passed in the exercise of police power, the court will presume that the city
council acted with full knowledge of the conditions relating to the subject of municipal legislation.
''That the zoning ordinance, otherwise valid,
limits use and depreciates value of property, is
no reason for holding void ordinance passed in
the interest of public welfare. Effective zoning
necessarily comprehends prohibitions against certain uses in named districts and restriction as to
area of lots to be built upon.''

Bwirkholder v. City

~of

Sterllim,g, 381 Ill. 564, 46 N.E.

2d 45. Here plaintiff sought to enjoin enforcement of
an ordinance amending a zoning ordinance to classify
as Commercial an area theretofore classified as Residential. A hearing was had before the amendment was
adopted at which prop·erty owners appeared both for
and against the amendment. The court says :
''It has been repeatedly stated by this court
that it will not constitute itself a zoning commission and that all questions relative to the
wisdom or desirability of particular restrictions
in a zoning ordinance rest with the legislative
bodies creating them and that a finding will not
be disturbed where there is ground for a legitimate difference of opinion concerning the reasonableness of a particular ordinance. It is not the
province of the courts to interfere with the disSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cretion of the legislative body in the absence of
a clear showing of an abuse of a discretion vested
in them. Where the advisability of restricting a
particular area for a p·articular use is debatable,
this court will not substitute its judgment for that
of the legislative body charged with the primary
duty and responsibility of determining the question.
''From a review of the factB it is obvious
that the advisability of adopting ordinance No.
752 (the amendment) was debatable. The property owners who were directly concerned in the
matter were about evenly divided. The commi-.
tee that conducted the first hearing, and the city
council approved the re-zoning ordinance and the
chancellor confirmed their action. Under such
circumstances this court cannot do otherwise than
affirm the decree.''
The court dismissed the complaint for want of
equity.

City .of Tusoon v. Arizorna Mortuary, 34 Ariz. 495,
2.72 P. 923. Before any ordinance was p~assed restricting
the place where mortuaries could he located, the Arizona
Mortuary purchased a traet in a residential area, obtained a permit authorizing construction thereon of a
mortuary, let a contract and commenced work. When
the p·eople in the -vicinity became aware of what was
intended they protested to the city council. An investi-gation was made and an o~dinance was piassed prohibiting mortuaries except in the· business district, where all'
other mortuaries were already located. The Mortuary
claimed the ordinance was invalid. The lower court held
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this residential district already had ·.some business establishments and was rapidly giving way to business, and
was very suitable to mortuary business and enjoined
enforcement of the ordinance. The supreme court reversed the decision saying:
''As we have .seen by the foregoing quotations from the Euclid Case (Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co. 272 U.S. 365, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L~.R.
1016), neither the mere fact that the natural development of a district was toward industrial enterprise and that the normal and reasonably to he
expected future use of certain p-roperty was for
industry and trade purposes, nor the fact that
property, if used for business purposes, would
be of more value than if u.sed for residential, will
justify the court in finding unconstitutional an
ordinance which checks or defeats such development or diverts it to another district.
"It is the rule in all cases involving the validity of the exercise of the police power that
courts will interfere with the action of the legislative authority only when it is plain and p·alpable
that the ordinance has no real or substantial
relation to the general welfare and tha~t it 1s
unrea.sonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory.''

Cassel Re1alty ·OompOfYIIJJ.V. City :of O.maha, 14 N.W.
2d 600.
"In an action in court to enjoin the enforcement of a zoning ordinance on the ground that it
is unrea.sonable, arbitrary and confiscatory it is
necessary to indulge the preS,:umption that the
City Commission in th·e enactment was in posSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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session of the fact relating to the necessity for
the zoning restriction and that its legislation related and responded to such necessitous condition.''
Miller v. Board of PwbUc Works, Cal. 2·34 P. 381,
38 A. L. R. 1479.

''Whenever the recognized purposes for
which the police power may be called in to play
or suhserved either by exclusion or segregation
of any business, it may be thus regulated. This
is but anothe·r way of saying that any zoning
regulation is a valid exercise of the police power
which is necessary to subserve the ends for which
the police power exista, namely, the promotion
of the public health, safety, morals, and general
welfare. It will thus be seen that the police power,
as evidenced in zoning ordinances, has a much
wider scope than the mere suppression of the offensive uses of property, and that it acts, not only
negatively, hut cons~tructively and affirmatively,
for the promotion of the public welf.are.
''As our civic life has developed so has the
definition of 'public welfare,' until it has been
held to embrace regulations 'to promote the
economic welfare, public conv_enience, and general
prosperity of the community.'
''Courts are loath to substitute their judgment as to the necessity for a particular enactment, for the legislative judgment as to the need
of such enactment with reference to the exercise
of the police power. A large discretion is vested in
the legislative branch of the government with
reference to the exercise of the police power.
Every intendment is to be indulged in by the
courts in favor of the validity of its exercise
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and, unless the measure is clearly opp·ressive, it
will be deemed to be within the purview of that
power. It is only when it is p·alpable that the
measure in controversy has no real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals,
or general welfare, that it will be nullified by the
courts. The courts may differ with the legislature
as to the wisdom or propriety of a particular
enactment as a means of accomplishing a particular end, but as long as there are considerations
of public health, safety, morals or general welfare
which the legislative body could have had in mind,
which could have justified the regulation, it must
be assumed by the court that the legislative body
had those considerations in mind, and that thos,e ·
considerations did justify the regulations. When
the necessity or propriety of an enactment was
a question upon which reasonable minds might
differ, the propriety and necessity or such ·enactment was a matter of legislative determination.
''We think it may be safely and sensibly said
that justification for re.sidential zoning may, in
the last analysis, be rested upon the protection
of the civic an·d social values of the American
home. The ·e'Stablishment of such districts is for
the general welfare because it t·ends to promote
and perpetuate the American home.''
·Oaire:s v. Building O·om.missioner of Hingham, 83

N.E. 2d 550.

''The planning hoard reported that there was
no real demand for the amendment and that the
matter could rest until a present need for it
should app·ear, and further suggested that no
zoning change be made until after the CommonSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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wealth decided whether Route 128 was to be relocated in the vicinity of ·the locus. The reason
for the decision of the board evidence the care
and consideration that were given to it; but while
a report ought to be filed before action at the
mee·ting, G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 40, Section 27, as
appearing in St. 1941, c. 320, so that the voters
may learn of its recommendation.s, the report was
only of an advisory nature and was not binding
upon the voters. See Duffey ·v. is:chool Commitee
of Hopkinton, 23'6 M-ass. 5, 127 N.E. 540; Sheldon
v. School Committee of Hopedale, 276 Mass. 230,
235, 177 N.E. 94. 'The board and voters might well
differ as to whether the time had arrived for a
change in the zoning by-law. Indeed, it has been
said that the necessity for legislation, like questions of· expediencey and the wisdom of an enactment, lie outside the judicial realm. Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 538, 54 S. C·t. 505,
78 L. Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469; United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115, 61 S. Ct. 451, 85 L. Ed.
609, 132 A.L.R. 1430; Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S.
286, 61 S. Ct. 86·2, 85 L. Ed. 1305, 133 A.L.A.
1500; Queenside Hills Realty Co., Inc., v. Saxl,
328 u.~s:. 80, 82,_ 66 S. Ct. 850, 90 L. Ed. 1096.
If it be thought that the necessity for an amendment should appear in order to justify the special .purposes for which an amendment may be
had to a zoning by-law, it is enough to point out
that a belief on the part of the voters, that additional use of the railroad premises would furnish
better and cheaper transportation facilities for
business firms that might locate there, even if
some location other than the locus might possibly
have been found, and that the location of a hay
and grain bu.siness and a lumber yard outside the
cent·er of the town would reduce the danger from
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fire, could not be pronounced unreasonable or
unwarranted.
''The activity of Robinson in getting the
amendment before the annual meeting, in advocating its passage by newpaper advertisements
and phamphlets, and in addressing the meeting,
and somewhat less activity by McNulty, would not
taint an enactment which was otherwise valid.
It is common knowledge that nowhere is there
a freer expression of individual views than at
a town meeting on matters in which the town
has an interest. ~Iuch may he said that may not
be germane to the question before the meeting,
but experience has taught that the good judgment
and common sense of the voters can be · saf.ely
relied upon to reach a correct decision. Publication of their opinions and debates by those holding various views only serve to assure such a decision. There is nothing here to indicate that the
majority of the voters were acting solely in behalf of Robinson and McNulty rather in the best
interests of the town as they thought, and there
is nothing in the slightest degree that affects the
integrity of their vote.
''In any event, a classification as the means
for attaining a permissible end is not to he declared invalid ''if any state of facts reasonably
can be conceived that would sustain it.'' Rast v.
Van D·eman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 357, 36
S. Ct. 370, 374, ~60 L. Ed. 67'9, L.R.A. 1917 A.
421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 49·5, 509, 57 S. Ct.
868, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327; New York
Rapid Transit Corp· v. New York, 303 U.S. 573,
. 578, 58 S. ·Ct. 721, 82 L. Ed. 1024. ''
''It cannot be said that the judgment of those
having an intimate knowledge of all the essential
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factors involved, that the amendment was in the
public interest, is entirely lacking in any rational
basis.. Due regard muE.:t be accorded to the collective judgment of those familiar with the locality and the circumstances prevailing in the
town. See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 105,
29 S. Ct. 567, 53 L.. Ed. 923.
''The vote of the town meeting referring to
''the whole or any part of'' the locus, which was
immediately followed by a definite and specific
description by metes and hounds of the entire
area, '' so that thereafter said area ·.shall be used
for business district uses as in said zoning law
provided,'' must be reasonably construed, not
''with technical strictness, but with the same liberality as all votes and proceedings of municipal
bodies or officers who are not presumed to be
versed in the forms of law; and every reasonable
presumption is to be made in its favor.'' Taunton
v. Taylor, 116 Mass~ 254, 261. The only area mentioned in the vote is the entire area, and the purport and effect of the vote, as expressly stated
upon its face, were to change the by-law ".so
that thereafter said area'' should be put in a business zone. A vote in favor of the am·endment
was a vote in favor of placing the entire area in
a business distriet and cannot be p~roperly construed as any thing else.''
Oorpora~ion

of Presidi:ng B·ishop v. City of Porterville, 203 P. 2d 82·3.
''The burden is upon the plaintiff to allege
and prove physical facts from which the court
could conclude as a matter of law that the ordinance was unreasonable and invalid. Wilkins v.
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City of :san Bernardino, supra, 29 Cal. 2d 332, at
page 338, 175 P. 2d 542.
''In enacting zoning ordinances, the municipality performs a legislative function and every
intendment is in favor of the validity of such
ordinances. Jardine v. City of P·asadena, 199 Cal.
64, 72-73, 248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R. ·509'. It is presumed
that the enactment as· a whole is justified under
the police power and adapted to promote the public health; safety, morals, and general welfare.
Lockare v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal. 2d ____ ,
202 P. 2d 38.
''There is reasonable justification for the action of the defendant city in prescribing the
buildings which may be erected and constructed in
the zone established for single family residences
and in such cases the wisdom of the prohibitions
and restrictions is a matter for legislative determination. Lockhard v. ·City of Los Angele-a,
supra, 33 Cal. 2d ____ , 202 p·. 2d 38. ''

Lockhard v. City of Los Angeles, 202 P. 2d 38.
' ' The courts will, of course, inquire as to whethe·r the scheme of classification and districting is
arbitrary or unreasonable, but the decision of the
zoning authorities as to matters of opinion and
policy will not be set aside or disregarde·d by the
courts unless the regulations have no reasonable
relation to the public welfare or unless. the physical
facts show that there has been an unreasonable,
opp~ressive, or unwarranted interfe·rence with property rights in the exercise of the police power.
See Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal.
2d 332, 338, 175 P. 2d 542, Acker v. Baldwin, 18
Cal. 2d 341, 344, 115 P. 2d 455; Reynolda v. Barett,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

50

12 .Cal. 2d 244, 251, 83 P. 2d 29; Jardine v. City
of Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 72-76, 248 P. 225, 48
A.L.R. 509; Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 195
Cal. 497, '514, 234 P. 388. The wisdom of the prohibi!tions and restrictions is a matter for legislative determination, and even though a court may
not agree with that determination, it will not substitute its judgment for that of the zoning authorities if there is any reasonable justification for
their action. Sunny Slope Water Co. v. City of
Pasadena, 1 Cal. 2d 87, 93, 94, 33 P. 2d 672; Wilkins v. City of San Bernardino, 29 Cal. 2d 332,
338, 339, 175 P. 2d 542, see Reynolds v. Barrett, 12
Cal. 2d 244, 83 P. 2d 29; Acker v. Baldwin, 18 Cal.
2d 341, 344, 115 P. 2d 455. In passing upon the
validity of legislation it has been said that ''the
rule is well settled that the legislative determination that the facts exist which make the law necessary must not ·be set aside or disregarded by the
courts, unless the legislative decision is clearly and
palpably wrong ~nd the error appears beyond reasonable doubt from facts or evidence which cannot be controverted, and of which the courts may
p·roperly take notice.'' In· re Miller, 162 Cal. 687,
·696, 124 P. 427, 429; see also, Jardine v. City of
Pasadena, 199 Cal. 64, 72, 248 P. 225, 48 A.L.R.
509.
''In considering the scope or nature of appellate review in a case of this type W·e must keep
in mind the fact that the courts are examining the
act of a coordinate branch of the government-the
legislative-in a field in which it has paramount
authority, and noit reviewing the decision of a lower
tribunal or a fact-finding body. Courts have nothing to do with the wisdom of laws or regulations,
and the legislative power must he upheld unless
manifestly abus·ed so as to infringe on constituSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

51
tional guaranties. The duty to uphold the legislative power is as much the duty of app·ellate courts ·
as it is of trial courts, and under the doctrine of
separation of powers neither the trial nor ap:pellate courts are authorized to "review" legislattive determinations. The only function of the
courts is to ·determine whether the exercise of legislative power has exceeded constitutional limitations.
''For the same reason the finding of the trial
court that the area on J eff,erson zoned M-1 is similar and identical to the area zoned C-2 is not controlling on the issue of the reasonableness of enacting the ordinance. It is well-·established that
similar characteristics in adjacent and Burrounding areas do not necessarily preclude the zoning
authorities from placing adjoining territories in
different zones or justify a court in substituting
its judgm·ent for the legislative decision.
''Moreover, it appears that the majority of
the M-1 uses were carried on by plaintiffs in defiance of the zoning regulations, and they cannot
take advantage of their own violations of the
law."
POINT VI
FIXING A BOUNDARY FiOR A USE DISTRI!CT AT A
CERTAIN NUMBER OF FEET FR.OM A GIVEN POINT
D:OES NOT MAKE THE ORDINAN~CE INVALID.
La~ngella

v. City ,of Ba;ya'J'IIne, 46 A. 2d 789. (N.J.)

Plaintiff operated a live poultry business at 116 West
21st Street. He decided to move to 67 W. 21st Street
and applied to the city for a transfer of his business.
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He complied with the changes p·rescribed ·by the city
health authorities. About this time the city adopted a
zoning ordinance placing 67 West 21st Street in a diatrict where live poultry business was prohibited. He
applied to the city council to transfer his license and
pe'rmission to op·erate at this address. At that time no
zoning hoard of adjustment had been appointed. The
city council granted his request over protest of residenta. After the hoard of adjustment was appointed he
applied to it for a variance which was approved. The
city ordinance provided that such business could not he
conducted where a church, school, library, hospital, sanitorium, or other public institution is located within 200
feet of the boundary line of the proposed site. The:re
was a .synagogue within 200 feet in a straight line. The
court held:
~

"We think the normal and ordinary meaning of the words used in this ordinance; that the
busineas is prohibited where a church is located
within 200 feet of the boundary line of the proposed site, is that the prohibited area measured
200 feet from such boundary line that is nearest
to the church in a straight line regardless of the
course followed, rather than in some other manner, such as by the usually traveled route or the
street lines.''
Vine v. Board of Adjustment Village of R.idgewo~od,
56 .A. 2d 122. Plaintiff ·aought review of action of the
Board of Adjustment in denying her leave to construct
a gasoline filling station on her property. The original
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zoning ordinance pJaced this property in a business zone.
In 1938 an amendment placed it in a "double dwelling"
zone. In a previous action the court foun·d that the property was not marketable· for either single or two family
dwellings nor for business establishments and held the
amendment an arbitrary interference. The city argues
that placing the property in a diatrict zoned against
gasoline stations is reasonable, and that to grant the
permit would run counter to an ordinance which provided that ''no part of any filling station shall be within
300 feet of any lot line of any plot on which is located
any building used as a church, etc.'' The proposed structure would be 300 feet from the nearest p·art of the edifice of the First Church of Christ Scientist, but substantially lesa than that distance from the closest boundary line of the Church Curtilage, measured in a direct
line. Plaintiff- claims that measurement from the line
of the Curtilage renders the provision arbitrary and
unre-asonable and therefore void, for if a given church
structure covers but one end of a large plot, the restricted area would be much greater on the one side than on
the other, and so the regulation would not apply to all
properties uniformly and equally. The court says:
"It is not arbitrary or unreasonable to provide for the measurement of the preacribed distance from the Curtilage rather than from the
church edifice ; an·d the church structure covers
the greater part of the tract.
''In the absence of a clear expression contra,
the restricted area is measurable by a straight
line from one point to another.''
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Helimerle v. Village of Bronxville, 5 N. Y. S. 2d
1002. On February 1, 1937, the plaintiffs Benedicts
leased a three story house with an option to buy, which
house was. located in BusinesB "A" District. The south
line of the lot was the north line of Residential "D"
District. The north line of '' D'' District across the
street was further north, about half the width of the lot
in question. An apa·rtment house of forty-one apart. .
ments was locate·d adjoining the boundary line on the
side of the street opposite the lot in quetStion. The house
was us.ed as a one-family residence from prior to 1901
to 1916, when it was changed to a three-family residence. Later the bottom floor was used by a veterinary
as an office and residence. When Benedicts becam·e interested in the premises they indicated to the superintendent of building their desire to use the first floor for
a funeral home. They were informed that the building
code did not permit conversion of the building from·
residence to business as it was of frame construction
and did not conform to the requirements of the code for
buildings used for business. Not withstanding this definite warning of a possible violation of the building code,
the Benedicts went ahead and leased the building and
commenced to use the first floor for a fun·eral home, in
the meantime filing these actions to restrain interference

with such action by the defendants. For this change of
use from residential purposes to the funeral home no
certificate of occupancy was ever obtained or even applied for by Benedicts, although the code required such
certificate.
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In 1922 defendant village adopted a zoning o·rdinance, substituting a new ordinance th·erefor in 1927.
The property in question was alway.s in business ''A''
district.
''Prior to 1931 this particular ·business district extended further to the south on both sides
of the stre-et. In 1931 the ordinance was amended
to make the division line between the two districts
where it now is, part of the busines.s district
being thereby transferred to the residence district. On December 7th, 1926, the Village ·also
adopted a Building Code. This Code has never
been amended since its adoption. The Zoning
Ordinance, so far as it relates to the premises in
question, has never been amended ·except that on ·
March 8th, 1937, the -amendment was adopted
which now p·rovides : 'No building or premises
shall be used, and no building shall he erected or
altere·d which is arranged, intended or designed
to be used ·as a mortuary, undertaking or embalming parlor, funeral chapel or similar plant or
establishm·ent within two hundred (200) feet of
any residence zone·.' ''
The court then holds that the use of the house as a
funeral home· prior to the passage of the am·endmen't of
the zoning ordinance on March 8, 193-7, was. in violation
of the Building Code and so did not establish a lawful
use prior to the passage of the zoning amendment. Th·e
court then says :
"From the foregoing it is obvious that th·e
amendment of March 8th, 1937, applies in its
terms to this particular p·roperty. This brings
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us to the next question. The plaintiffs claim that
such amendment is unrea8onable and void for two
·reasons: First, because such amendment, upon
· its face, is so arbitrary and unreasonable, and
lacks such relation to p·ublic welfare, ·etc.; that it
is void as a matter of law. :s:econd, if the amendment be held to be valid upon its face and within
the authority of the municip;ality to adopt, then
it is unreasonable and void as applied to the
premises of the plaintiffs. These questions will
be considered in the order indicated.''
The court then discusses the authorities on the question of the right to limit undertaking establishments in
a zoning ordinance and concludes that the right exists.
The ·court then says :
"The ·determination of the first objection
made to this amendment by the plaintiffs must
be made upon the ordinance itself. Town of Islip
v. F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., 257 N.Y.
167, 177 N. E. 409. The test is, can it be said that
the ordinance in this respect on its face passes
the bounds of reason and assumes the character
of a merely arbitrary ~at~ Village of Euclid,
Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, at page
389, 47 S. Ct. -114, 118, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R.
1016; Town of Islip v. F. E. Summers Coal &
Lumber ·Co., supra. If the validity of the legislative ·classification for zoning purposes be fairly
debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., sup-ra, p~age 388, 47 S. Ct. page
118; Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, at page
29~6, 150 N. E. 120, 43 A.L.R. 651; Town of Islip
v. F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., supra, at
page 169, 177 N. E. 409. So considered the court

'
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has reached the conclusion that it cannot he said
upon mere inspection of the Zoning Ordinance
that the end in view is not reasonably p~ursued by
its adoption in order to promote the general welfare under the police power. Town of Islip v.
F. E. Summers Coal & Lumber Co., supra. In
effect, the village has defined a residence district
for the exclusion therefrom of general business
and then provided for its extension for an additional 200 feet with respect to the particular
business of undertaking establishments. This is·
not a violation of the provisions of section 176
of the Village Law that· all such regulations shall
be uniform for each class or kind of buildings
throughout each district. By that section the
regulations in one district may differ from those
in another district. The regulations are uniform with respect to undertaking establishments
throughout the district thus extended. Such an
ordinance, as indicated by the authorities cited,
may be sustained under the general welfare
power, without p·articular regard to zoning ordinances, where the residential area is definitely
defined ·and the limitation reasonable. It cannot
be said here that 200 feet is unreasonable as a
matter of law so as to invalidate the .entire amendment.
"Upon the second contention that the ordi-·
nance is in fact unreasonable and void as applied
to this particular property, the plaintiffs have the·
burden nf proof. The evidence shows that the
property immediately adjoins a residence district.
The building is within a few feet of another
building used for residence purpos·es. Many
other residences· exist within the neighborhood
on both sides of the street in the residence district. Opposite is an apartment house with fortySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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one families. The owners may be able to derive
more money on a sale for this particular business
purpose than _for some other purpose, but the
property is still available for use as a residence
and the pecuniary reason alone is not sufficient
to invalidate the ordinance. The fact is that if it
is properly converted in accordance with the
Building Code, the building may be used for many
kinds of business with equal facility. The fact
that other property within the 200 foot distance
in other locations may be unreasonably affected,
if such fact exists, does not aid the plaintiffs.
Brown v. City of Los Angeles, supra. The only
question which the plaintiffs are entitled to argue
is that the restriction is unreasonable as applied
to this property. Wulfsohn v. Burden, supra.
'The burden of proof on that subject has not been
sustained by the plaintiffs. The undisputed facts
definitely show the contrary. ''
We wish to here point out that Section 176 of the
Village Law referred to in the foregoing case is identical to Section 15-8-90, heretofore quoted under Point

IV.
White v. Lwquire Fwnenal H:ome, 221 Ala. 440,
129 'Slo. 84. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendant
from erecting and 1op~erating a funeral home in the
plaintiffs' imm·ediate neighbo-rhood. The site of the
funeral home was in a commercial zone. The zoning
ordinance permitte:d erection and ·use of buildings in
commercial zone for ~any purpose except sp-ecified uses,
specifying that ''undertaking, embalming, or cremating
parlor if so located that any part is within 300 feet of
any lot which is a residence district and which abuts
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upon any part of any stree't which adjoins the lot upon
which such structure is situated.'' Defendant's p·arlor
was permitted under this ordinance. The court says :
''We cannot say that the zoning of the site
of this funeral home within a commercial district,
with authority to conduct such business at points·
within such district, was arbitrary· or unreasonable upon consideration of all the factors of the
problem. Indeed, we cannot say we know all the
considerations that may have properly influenced
the zoning of this property.
''We are not unmindful that the sam.e discomfort comes to residents thus brought into
near contact with a funeral home as if no zoning
ordinance ·existed. Complain·ants are entitled to
the protection accorded to all others in the enjoyment of the family residence under like conditions. What we do hold is that all of us must
bear ·such discomforts as com·e from changing
conditions of city life, among them :the lawful zoning of our properties with a view to the general
welfare.''
The case of In Re J er~Jn,ings' Est'at.e, 198 A. 621.
The trustees of the estate of Jennings, deceased, applied
to the Board of Adjustment for leave to p·ermit occupancy of a certain 2¥2 story residence, containing nineteen rooms and four baths, as a fraternity house. The
prop·erty had been vacant since 1921 and they were unable either to sell it or rent it for one-family occupancy
or for any purpose not prohibited by Section 9-A of the
zoning 'Ordinance. During its vacancy large sums of
money had been spent on its upkeep·. The application
was made in 1937 and was deniQd by the Board after
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a_ hearing. The Board-. decided it could not grant the
application as it would involve amending the ordinance
and this was solely within the jurisdiction of the City
Council. The prop~erty was changed in 1926 from B
Residence to C Residence. In the latter district only
one-family dwellings were permitted. Se·ction 3 of the
ordinance defines multiple dwellings as one ''designed
for or occupied otherwise than as a one-family dwelling,
two-family dwelling, or double house'' and include·s fraternity houses in the multiple dwelling class_.. The result
of the denial of the ·application amounted to virtual confiscation under the restricted uses of the zoning ordinance. The court says:
"As it appeared that the proposed use was
a multiple dwelling within the definition of the
ordinance, and that it was a use prohibited by
Sec. 9-A, the actfon of the board was strictly in
accord with the ordinance.
''Appellants, while apparently not denying
that their proposed use is prohibited, ~contend
that strict enforcement will result in unconstitutional deprivation of the use of their property
for the reasons quoted above (could not be sold
or rented for any purpose, amounting to confiscation) ; that the decision appealed from is 'a manifest and flagrant abuse of discretion,' an'd that
this court should now so -declare.
''The court is not empowered to say that the
general welfare of the other property owners
whose use is limited to one-family residences is
secured and the sp·irit of this ordinance .is observed and substantial justice done by excepting
/ .from the operation of the ordinance the particular
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dwelling owned by the appellants. Flats ·or small
apartment houses may be entirely exclude-d from
residential districts.''

We respectfully submit that the plaintiffs did not
have -such an interest as entitles them, or either
them,
to attac:k the ordinance in question upon the grounds
asaerted in this cause. We further submit that there
is no evidence in the record to overcome the presumption
that the ordinance is valid. The plaintiffs must rely
solely upon a mere insp-ection of the ordinance as the
basis of asserting it is invalid as there is no evidence
to assiat them. Under such conditions the court could
not say as ·a matter of law that the ordinance is invalid.
It is not the provin·ce of the courts to invade th.e broad
discretionary powers vested in the_ City Commission to
determine its legislative policy in zoning the City.

of

We respectfully su~mit that the judgm,ent of the
trial court should be sustained.
- Respectfully submitted,

E. R. CHRISTENSEN,
City Attorney
HOMER HOLMGREN,
A. PRATT KESLER,
.A.s.sistamt Cit.y A:t torneys,
Attorneys fo'f Defendants
·and Resrpondents.
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